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We study the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in the EU countries, for the 
period 1995-2019. Our results show notably that: i) the inflation rate has a relevant impact 
over the central banks’ decision making; ii) the cyclically adjusted primary balance reacts 
positively to increases in the level of government debt; iii) monetary policy reaction functions 
do not seem to take into consideration the cyclically adjusted primary balance; iv) fiscal 
policy, via the cyclically adjusted primary balance, seem to be affected by the short-term 
interest rate in a negative way. The global economic and financial crisis impacted negatively 
both the short-term nominal interest rates and the cyclically adjusted primary balance, 
however with a higher degree in the euro area. 
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“We need to reflect on is interactions between monetary and fiscal policies. 
When central banks have to use balance sheet policies extensively, there is an 
inevitable strengthening of the interplay between monetary and fiscal policies. 





Monetary policy relates to all the actions and measures that central banks devise and 
implement in their aim to fulfil their mandate and mission of notably price stability. In their 
pursuit to achieve their goal, central banks rely on open market operations, reserve requirements 
and discount rates. By contrast, governments decided and implement fiscal policy. via changes 
in the composition of a country’s government expenditure and revenues, with the objective of 
influencing macroeconomic conditions and fostering economic activity. 
Over time, the historical effectiveness of monetary policy as a means to overcome crises or 
boost activity in the financial sector (hence transmitting its effects to the real economy) 
relegated fiscal policy to a second place. Monetary policy does not have an implementation lag 
as big as that of fiscal policy, influencing economic conditions quickly and effectively. 
However, it would be amiss to dissociate the study of these two policies: the success of 
monetary policy depends on fiscal sustainability and the value of government’s liabilities can 
be influenced by the price level. For that reason, studying the effects that each of these policies 
have on one another becomes important, in order to understand how each of the authorities 
(monetary and fiscal) affects the economy separately and jointly. 
The economic and financial crisis of 2007-2009 put a spotlight on the interactions between 
monetary and fiscal policies. In their attempts to counter the effects of the crisis, central banks 
around the world eased monetary conditions, lowering interest rates, and supplying abundant 
liquidity to the banking sector. The constraints imposed by the zero lower bound led central 
banks to the implementation of so-called unconventional monetary policy. Despite all the 
efforts, these measures did not yield sufficient results, and governments were required to step 
in and play a more significant role. Several countries adopted expansionary packages, with the 
intention of avoiding even worse macroeconomic consequences and helping economic activity 
to recover. These decisions led governments to face historically high budget deficits and debt 




The European Union (EU) is an interesting case study when it comes to the effects of the 
policy mix: the twenty-eight Member States represent a highly heterogeneous pool due to their 
levels of indebtedness, growth and inflation rates, among others. In addition, we can identify 
two sub-groups: one whose members are those countries that adopted the euro as their currency 
(euro-area countries), and another one for those countries which decided to maintain their 
national currency (non-euro area countries). In non-euro area countries, the corresponding 
national central bank operates as ultimate monetary authority, implementing their policy based 
on national objectives. Fiscal policy is also the national government’s prerogative. In the case 
of the euro area, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the authority in the design and 
implementation of monetary policy (being part of the Eurosystem), while each country is 
responsible for its fiscal decisions. This leads to a situation where, in the countries that use the 
euro as their currency, there is a one-size-fits-all monetary policy. Studying how this common 
policy interacts with the country-specific fiscal policies is of great interest. 
In this paper, we use an empirical approach to analyse monetary and fiscal policies 
interactions in the EU. For that, we perform a panel data analysis with data from the twenty-
eight countries that belong to the EU. Our data covers the period between 1995 and 2019, and 
also look at potential differences in the way monetary and fiscal policies were pursued prior 
and after the 2007-2009 crisis. 
Our results suggest that monetary policy strongly reacts to the inflation rate, while not taking 
into consideration the cyclically adjusted primary balance. On the other hand, fiscal authorities 
seem to be concerned with the public finances, since the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
reacts positively to the debt level, a rather Ricardian result. Moreover, there is evidence that the 
relation between monetary and fiscal policies is of substitutability, as the monetary authority 
seems to be dominant when the cyclically adjusted primary balance is more pronounced.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the data used in this study and the adopted econometric approach. Section 
4 provides an empirical assessment to monetary policy, fiscal policy and the policy mix, 
including the functions used and the discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Theoretical Background 
There has been a sustained belief in economics that inflation is solely a monetary 




price stability is achieved through the commitment of the central bank to such objective. 
Through the intertemporal government budget constraint, we can understand both this 








𝑠=0      (1) 
  
where Bt is the outstanding nominal government debt in period t, Pt is the price level in period 
t, st is the real primary budged balance at period t and r is the real interest rate. Taking into 
consideration Equation (1), the monetarist doctrine defends that the constraint should restrict 
the expenditure and revenue policies implemented by the government. This said, those policies 
must be adjusted, so that for any Pt, Equation (1) holds. Hence, when the relation is not in 
equilibrium, the government is the one that must adjust its policies, through revenues or 
expenses, in order to restore the equality. Authors such as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
perpetuated this theory. 
However, toward the end of the twentieth century, the belief that both monetary and fiscal 
policy play an important role in the determination of the price level increased. Sargent and 
Wallace (1981) were the first authors to explore the idea of a policy mix, concluding that, in a 
situation where the fiscal authority establishes its policies without taking into consideration the 
decisions made by the central bank, the monetary authority may be forced later on to accept a 
price level higher than desired. 
After Sargent and Wallace’s work, some other authors, notably Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), 
and Woodford (1995) went a step further and defended a less orthodox view, which was 
encapsulated in the so-called Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), that contradicted the 
quantity theory of money. According to this theory, Equation (1) does not constrain the 
government policy making, since there is nothing obliging it to do so. Instead, when the equality 
in (1) is disturbed, the consequence is a change in the price P, so that the equilibrium is restored. 
According to Leeper (1991), monetary and fiscal policies may have active or passive roles. 
The author presented two scenarios: one in which there is an active monetary policy and a 
passive fiscal policy (and hence the government decision making takes into consideration debt 
shocks). On the other hand,  in another scenario, the shocks in the debt level affect money 
creation, meaning that monetary policy has a passive role, while fiscal policy is not constrained 




Sims (1994) defended that monetary policy, by itself, is not sufficient to determine the 
equilibrium price level, since fiscal policy also plays an important role. The author stated that 
the value of fiat money depends on how the public sees the soundness of fiscal policy. This 
said, the decision making of the government has a direct effect over the price level, which 
depends on the perception that agents have over the fiscal policies being implemented. 
In turn, Woodford (1995) criticised the quantity theory of money arguing that this view is 
incomplete, since it does not consider the effect of fiscal policy over the price level. Contrarily, 
the price level is relevant in the government decision making because it changes the real value 
of net government liabilities. Hence, Woodford established two policy regimes regarding the 
determination of the price level: the Ricardian and the non-Ricardian regimes. On the one hand, 
in the Ricardian regime, in which the quantity theory of money stands correct, the government 
has no effect over the determination of the price level. Regarding this regime, the author stated, 
"such regimes represent a highly special case, for there is no reason why a well-formulated 
policy rule must force to hold, regardless of the path of the price level." On the other hand, the 
non-Ricardian regime is characterised by a government that is not constrained by the evolution 
of the public debt, and hence is not following a Ricardian policy. In this situation, the central 
bank must adjust its monetary policy, so that the intertemporal budget constraint is met. 
The topic of the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies gained renewed 
importance with the Great Recession. As Blanchard et al. (2010) stated, during the financial 
crisis, because of the zero-lower bound, conventional monetary policy became ineffective and 
most central banks in developed countries turned into unconventional policies, that went from 
quantitative easing to target easing and new forms of liquidity provision. However, monetary 
policy was reaching its limits and the need to rely on fiscal policy rose. Moreover, since the 
crisis was expected to last, fiscal policies would be beneficial, even with the lags associated 
with it.  
Furthermore, Blanchard et al. (2013) suggested new solutions for the after-crisis. For central 
banks’ decision making it is proposed that they should also target financial stability and 
economic activity, while performing forward guidance, so that they are able to influence market 
expectations. In fact, the authors stated that there is evidence that forward guidance 
announcements have an economic impact, and that, while other unconventional monetary 
policy tools may end up being unnecessary, forward guidance is here to stay. Regarding fiscal 
policy, Blanchard et al. (2013) highlighted the important aspect of the risk of fiscal dominance. 




pressure on the central banks to help limiting borrowing costs, hence jeopardising the central 
bank independence. 
 
2.2. Empirical Research 
The existing literature on the topic focuses especially on the individual reaction functions 
of monetary and fiscal policies. Nevertheless, some authors also studied the interaction between 
these policies, besides the single effects. 
Regarding the monetary policy reaction function, most of the literature takes interest rates 
as the main variable. Taylor (1993) proposed a monetary policy rule in order to control the 
inflation rate, which is known as the Taylor rule. According to this rule, central banks should 
increase interest rates when inflation is high or when there is a positive output gap. Several 
central banks around the world used the logic of the Taylor rule and its effectiveness has been 
assessed several times.  
Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) showed that, between 1990 and 1998, for the countries that 
afterwards adhered to the euro area, the monetary policy reaction function proposed by Taylor 
(1993) is a good fit. The authors state that the ECB could use the Taylor rule to conduct its 
monetary policy. Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) corroborated these results, but found that when 
adding M3, the broadest monetary aggregate, and the fluctuations of stock prices, the accuracy 
of the model increases. Furthermore, Ruth (2007) estimated an interest rate reaction function, 
for the euro area, using panel data, finding that the ECB only deviated from the interest rate 
path when there was area-wide inflation. 
Taking fiscal policy, and its long-run stability, into consideration, studies focus, essentially, 
on two indicators: the debt stock level and the primary balance flow. To assess fiscal policy 
feedback rules in the United States of America (USA), Favero and Monacelli (2003) estimated 
Markov-switching regression methods, for the period between 1960 and 2002. The authors 
found that the regimes are not fixed throughout time, changing from a non-Ricardian regime, 
from the 1960s throughout the 1980s, to a Ricardian regime afterwards. Sala (2004) made an 
analysis, also for the USA, and for the same period as Favero and Monacelli (2003) and by 
performing a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) analysis observed that between 1960 and 1979 there 
is evidence of a non-Ricardian regime and that from 1990 onwards there seems to exist a 
Ricardian regime. Moreover, Sala (2004) stated that between 1982 and 1990 there is no fiscal 
regime defined. During this period, the central bank was implementing measures to reduce 




Afonso (2008) tested whether regimes in the EU-fifteen countries are Ricardian or non-
Ricardian by using panel data, for the period between 1970 and 2003. The results showed that, 
during that period, there is evidence of the presence of Ricardian fiscal regimes, since the budget 
balance reacts to the debt level. The author also found evidence that the higher the indebtedness 
of the country, the higher the fiscal policy effort to deliver a surplus. To study the fiscal policy 
behaviour in Japan, the USA and the United Kingdom (UK), Ito et al. (2011) estimated a 
Markov-switching model by the Bayesian method, spanning more than a century for all the 
countries. The authors observed that, while in Japan there is a stochastic switch between 
Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes, for the USA and the UK there is evidence that the fiscal 
policy presented a Ricardian Regime. 
Concerning the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, Semmler and Zhang 
(2004) implemented a State-Space model with Markov-switching for France and Germany and 
found that, for those countries, the interactions between the two policies were not strong, 
contrariwise they were countercyclical for the period under analysis. Cevik et al. (2014) 
achieved similar results, when performing a joint transition matrix for the two policies, for some 
emerging European economies, between 1995 and 2010. 
Davig and Leeper (2011) performed Markov-switching monetary and fiscal policy rules, for 
the USA, concluding that the regimes fluctuate throughout time, between active and passive, 
but that the periods with a passive monetary policy tend to last more. Also for the USA, Bianchi 
and Ilut (2017) used a Markov-switching Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
model to understand the policy mix, concluding that the fiscal regimes change from passive to 
active throughout time. Moreover, the authors found that when fiscal policy is active, a fiscal 
imbalance leads to a lasting increase in the price level, while the monetary authority has no 
power over inflation. Hence, the decision making of the central bank is only going to be 
effective, and have influence over the price level, when the fiscal authority takes those decisions 
in consideration. 
Afonso and Toffano (2013) assess the existence of fiscal regime shifts in the U.K., Germany, 
and Italy, using Markov switching fiscal rules, respectively for the periods, 1970:4-2010:4, 
1979:4-2010:3, and 1983:3-2010:4. They report that While in the UK “active” and “passive” 
(Leeper, 1991) fiscal regimes are somewhat clearer cut, in Germany fiscal regimes have been 
overall less active, supporting more fiscal sustainability. For Italy, a more passive fiscal 




To evaluate the policies interactions, Afonso et al. (2019) estimated a monetary authority 
function with fiscal variables and a fiscal authority function with monetary variables. The 
authors used a panel data set, with a time span from 1970 to 2015, of the twenty-eight EU 
countries. The authors concluded that central banks do not react to fiscal policy, acting 
passively, and that the primary balance reacts positively to government debt, however with a 
lower impact than the one that exists when considering the fiscal individual reaction functions. 
Regarding the effect that de Great Recession had over monetary and fiscal policies, Mitreska 
et al. (2010) concluded that with the financial crisis there were a lot of tools that were 
implemented by central banks and governments and that the policy mix might have been 
affected by those stimuli. The authors find that this change is stronger in developed countries, 
in which the fiscal policy had a larger impact during the crisis.  
Alcidi and Thirion (2016) studied the policy mix for the euro area, the USA and the UK, in 
the periods before and after the financial crisis. Their main conclusions were that from 2000 to 
2015, the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies appeared to be different in the euro 
area relative to the USA. For instance, because of unconventional monetary policy measures, 
the inverse relationship between interest rates and inflation is not so relevant in the after-crisis 
period since the interest rate stopped being a good proxy for monetary policy. Concerning fiscal 
policy, the euro area had a more conservative procedure because of fiscal rules, the shock of 
sovereign crisis and the fiscal cost that most governments had after the support given to 
financial institutions. 
Silva and Vieira (2017) used panel data for advanced and developing economies and 
estimated a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model for two periods: before the 
financial crisis (from 2001 to 2008) and after (from 2009 to 2012). For the monetary policy 
reaction function, the authors concluded that when there is a change in inflation, the central 
bank policy is going to have the same sign, and that this relation did not change with the 
financial crisis. However, for most advanced economies, this policy is not pursued through a 
change in the nominal interest rate, because of the zero lower bound, but through 
unconventional monetary instruments. For the fiscal policy reaction function, Silva and Vieira 
(2017) concluded that prior to the crisis, the higher the budget balance in one period, the lower 
the government expenditure in the following period. However, this relation ceased to exist after 
the financial crisis, in the case of advanced economies, where the use of fiscal policy gained a 





3. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
In our analysis we use annual data from 1995 to 2019, for the 28 countries that belong to 
the European Union. We can split these countries into two groups, the ones that belong to the 
euro area – Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Spain, and the ones that did not adopt the common currency – Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
The data used in this study is from the European Commission AMECO database. The 
dataset includes the following variables: cyclically adjusted primary balance (capb); debt ratio 
(debt); short-term nominal interest rate (i); long-term nominal interest rate (il); real effective 
exchange rate (reer); inflation rate (π), measured as the instantaneous growth rate of the 
Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI). 
Moreover, to assess the impact of the financial crisis on the implementation of monetary 
and fiscal policies, and the interaction between them, a dummy variable for the after-crisis 
period (from 2009 to 2019) was created. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The description 
of the data being used is presented in the Appendix. 
 
Table 1 –Descriptive Statistics for the full sample: 1995-2019 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
capb 700 0.064 3.240 -29.233 9.565 
debt 693 56.656 33.440 3.766 181.212 
i 663 4.037 7.305 -0.500 80.750 
il 614 4.367 2.654 -0.250 22.500 
reer 700 98.672 15.480 29.986 170.322 
inf 676 1.327 2.332 -0.741 40.643 
 
The analysis estimate unbalanced panel data specifications, with cross-sectional and a times 
series dimensions. 
The methodologies being applied are the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the Two-stage 
Least Square (2SLS) and the GMM models. Using OLS with panel data may lead to 
heterogeneity bias, if the unique errors are correlated with the independent variables. Therefore, 
we also resort to 2SLS, which allows us to deal with endogeneity, the problem of omitted 




conditions must be satisfied, so that we have a relevant instrument: it must not have partial 
effects over the dependent variable and needs to be uncorrelated with the omitted variables 
(Wooldridge, 2016). In this work, one-period lag independent variables are used as instruments. 
In order to decide between fixed and random effects, we run a Hausman (1978) test. This allows 
us to test whether the unique errors are correlated with the regressors, being the null hypothesis 
that they are not. Hence, if we reject the null hypothesis (that the preferred model is random 
effects), we use fixed effects. 
Moreover, we also estimated a two-step system GMM. Besides taking into consideration 
the time series dimension of the data, this method also treats the explanatory variables as being 
endogenous and deals with non-observable effects (Verbeek, 2014). In order to test the 
validation of the instruments being used, we resort to the Hansen (1982) statistic. We also test 
for the presence of second order autocorrelation of the error term, by looking at the AR(2). 
Because of the mentioned characteristics, we give priority to the GMM method for the EU and 
to the 2SLS1 method when considering the euro area and non-euro area sub-groups. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The empirical analysis of is divided into 4 different parts. Firstly, we estimate, separately, 
the individual reaction functions for monetary policy and for fiscal policy. Afterwards, in order 
to observe the interactions between the two policies, we estimate the same regressions as for 
the individual authorities, but with a difference: while the monetary policy reaction function 
includes a fiscal variable, the fiscal policy reaction function will feature monetary variables. 
 
4.1. Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
Most of the existent literature on the analysis of monetary policy follows the Taylor rule, 
where the interest rate is the monetary instrument. We follow the same strategy, and we will 
focus our analysis in the conventional monetary instruments. Hence, the monetary policy 
regression is given by the following expression: 
 
𝑖𝑗𝑡  = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝜋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡   (2) 
 
                                                     





where the index j (j = 1,2,...,J) represents the country, the index t (t = 1,…,,T) denotes the period, 
i is the short-term nominal interest rate, π is the inflation rate, reer is the real effective exchange 
rate and aftcri a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when t is between 2009 and 2019 and 0 
otherwise. Moreover, βj, stands for the country fixed effects µjt are the independent disturbances 
across countries. 
In Table 2 the estimated results for regression (2) are presented. Regarding the EU, all the 
variables, besides the real effective exchange rate, are statistically significant at a 1% level. 
Both the one-period lagged nominal interest rate and the inflation rate have a positive impact 
over the nominal interest rate however with different magnitudes. 
 
Table 1 - Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
Method OLS-FE OLS-RE OLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE GMM 
Group EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU 
Constant  1.478** 1.329*** -0.693 -1.112* 0.355 -3.823 1.520 
  (0.713) (0.484) (1.353) (0.620) (0.587) (2.752) (1.533) 
ijt-1  0.566*** 0.632*** 0.543*** 0.578*** 0.547*** 0.560*** 0.595*** 
  (0.018) (0.024) (0.0289) (0.044) (0.035) (0.139) (0.023) 
infjt  1.163*** 0.636*** 1.296*** 1.144*** 1.006*** 1.235** 1.066*** 
  (0.052) (0.078) (0.087) (0.166) (0.146) (0.530) (0.075) 
reerjt  -0.012 -0.007 0.012 0.014** 0.002 0.043 -0.012 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005) (0.028) (0.016) 
aftcrijt  -0.950*** -1.181*** -0.940** -1.042*** -1.266*** -1.017** -0.924*** 
  (0.160) (0.144) (0.400) (0.154) (0.160) (0.430) (0.174) 
N  633 437 196 605 418 187 633 
R2  0.917 0.840 0.936 0.917 0.814 0.939 - 
countries 28 19 9 28 19 9 28 
Hausman prob.  0.013 0.410 0.650 0.521 0.928 0.999 - 
AR(2)  - - - - - - 0.513 
Hansen stat.  - - - - - - 0.245 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *, 10%; **, 5% ; *** 1%. 
 
 While an increase of 1% in the lagged interest rate leads to a rise of 0.595% in the interest rate, 
rising the inflation rate by 1% soars the dependent variable by 1.066%. When looking at the 
after-crisis period, the interest rates are, on average, 0.924% lower than in the period between 
1995 and 2008. This outcome was predictable since most countries have been dealing with low 
inflation rates, leading to central banks responding with low interest rates. 
Comparing the results for the euro area and the non-euro area countries, it is possible to 
observe that the real effective exchange rate is still the only variable that it is not statistically 




similar. However, when looking at the inflation rate, there seems to exist evidence that when it 
changes, it has a higher impact on the interest rates of non-euro area countries than in euro area 
ones. Concerning the after-crisis period, the coefficients are negative, and higher for the 
countries that use the euro, suggesting that the ECB lowered the interest rates more aggressively 
than the other national central banks. In fact, while in the euro countries the nominal interest 
rates decreased, on average, 1.266% in the postcrisis, in the other EU countries they only 
decreased by 1.017%, on average. Notably, the R2 lowers when analysing only the euro area 
countries, suggesting that the interest rate in that area was more affected by variables that are 
not captured in the model. 
Our results regarding the implementation of monetary policy are coherent with those found 
by Wolters (2012) and Silva and Vieira (2017). 
 
4.2. Fiscal Policy Reaction Function 
Regarding the fiscal policy reaction function, the dependent variable is normally the primary 
budget balance. It looks logical that, if countries want to reduce their public debt stock, there is 
the need to deliver, at least, primary surpluses. In this study, the fiscal policy reaction function 
suggested by (Afonso, 2008) is followed and adapted as follows: 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑗𝑡  = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡   (3) 
 
where the index j (j = 1,2,...,J) represents the country, the index t (t = 1,0,...,T) denotes the 
period, capb is the cyclically adjusted primary balance, debt is the percentage given by the ratio 
of government debt over potential output and aftcri a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
when t is between 2009 and 2019 and 0 otherwise. Moreover, βj, stands for the individual effects 
for each country j and µj,t are the independent disturbances across countries. 
Besides analysing the effect of the level of public debt over the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance, we also want to assess how a variation of the public debt affects that same dependent 
variable. That said, we use Equation (3), substituting the debt level by the variation of the public 
debt. The new equation is given by: 
 





The results from the estimation of regression (3) are presented in Table 3 (and of Equation 
(4) are in Table A2 in the Appendix). Firstly, starting with the results for Equation (3) and 
looking at the EU, we can observe that all variables are statistically significant at a 1% level. 
The cyclically adjusted primary balance seems to be positively impacted by its one-period lag, 
rising by 0.666% when the lagged one increases by 1%. Regarding the one-period lagged debt 
level, we can state that when it rises by 1%, the cyclically adjusted primary balance increases 
by 0.0016%. Since a rise in the debt level leads to an increase in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance, we can assume that the EU, as a whole, follows a Ricardian fiscal regime, maintaining 
a stable financial situation. According to the results, the years after the Great Recession had a 
negative impact over the cyclically adjusted primary balance, lowering it by 0.966% on 
average. 
 
Table 2 - Fiscal Policy Reaction Function 
Method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE 2SLS-FE 2SLS-FE 2SLS-FE GMM 
Group EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU 
Constant  -2.168*** -2.895*** -1.171*** -2.591*** -3.254*** -1.689*** -0.378 
  (0.295) (0.417) (0.360) (0.317) (0.446) (0.392) (0.252) 
capbjt-1  0.605*** 0.611*** 0.593*** 0.629*** 0.664*** 0.548*** 0.666*** 
  (0.029) (0.035) (0.049) (0.045) (0.054) (0.077) (0.032) 
debtjt-1  0.051*** 0.062*** 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.068*** 0.047*** 0.016*** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) 
aftcrijt  -1.433*** -1.859*** -0.829*** -1.499*** -1.870*** -0.941*** -0.966*** 
  (0.195) (0.268) (0.254) (0.220) (0.301) (0.286) (0.202) 
N  665 456 209 637 437 200 665 
R2  0.501 0.500 0.536 0.520 0.512 0.565 - 
Countries 28 19 9 28 19 9 28 
Hausman prob.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 
AR(2)  - - - - - - 0.809 
Hansen stat.  - - - - - - 0.252 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *, 10%; **, 5% ; *** 1%. 
 
Now looking at the Equation (4), it is possible to observe that the variation of public debt is 
the only statistically significant at a 1% level2. If we compare the results above stated, for 
regression (3), with the ones estimated for this specification we can state that the Great 
Recession seems to have no effect this time. However, governments react to both the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance from the previous year and the variation of the debt level. In fact, a 
                                                     
2 In this situation we will resort to the 2SLS method, since the Hansen statistics for the GMM is too high to be 




positive variation of public debt of 1% leads to a decrease of 0.467% on the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance. 
Regarding regression (3) and observing the two sub-groups, the euro area and the noneuro 
area countries, all variables continue to be statistically significant at a 1% level, with some 
differences arising between the two areas. There seems to exist evidence that the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance is positively affected by its lag with a higher impact in the euro area 
than in the non-euro area countries. Concerning the lagged debt level, its coefficient is slightly 
higher in the euro area: when it rises by 1%, it leads to an increase of 0.068% in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance, comparing with an increase of 0.047% for the non-euro area 
countries. 
Concerning the post-crisis period, it is clear that its negative impact was substantially higher 
in the countries that adopted the euro. In fact, that decrease in euro area countries was on average 
of 1.870%, almost double than in countries that did not adopt the euro, that suffered a decrease 
of 0.941%, on average. This information fits together with the countries that had sovereign debt 
crisis (e.g. Portugal, Ireland and Greece) that were mostly members of the euro area. 
Looking again at Equation (4), it is possible to observe that, for both euro and noneuro 
countries, the only variable that is statistically significant at a 5% level is the variation of public 
debt. Comparing these estimations with those of regression (3) we can state right ahead that the 
financial crisis had no impact over the relations presented in this regression, for both sub-
groups. Governments of both sub-groups seem to only respond to the variation of the debt level, 
however with a higher magnitude in the euro area countries than in the non-euro area ones. In 
fact, while for the euro countries a positive variation of the public debt of 1% leads to a decrease 
of 0.525% on the cyclically adjusted primary balance, for non-euro countries, the reduction is 
only of 0.492%. 
The results for fiscal regimes are consistent with the ones reported by Afonso (2008), Bajo-
Rubio et al. (2009) and Afonso and Jalles (2017). 
 
4.3. Monetary Policy Reaction Function and Fiscal Determinants 
In order to observe if there is some evidence that the central bank’s decision making takes 
into consideration the behaviour of the government, Equation (2) is again computed, but with a 
little twist: the addition of the cyclically adjusted primary balance with one period lag. The new 





𝑖𝑗𝑡  = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝜋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝛽5𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑗𝑡−1 + µ𝑖𝑡.  (5) 
 
In Table 4 the estimated results for regression (5) are presented. Regarding the EU, all the 
variables, besides the real effective exchange rate and the one-period lagged cyclically adjusted 
primary balance, are statistically significant at a 1% level. The first aspect that stands out is that 
central banks are not reacting to fiscal policy, since the cyclically adjusted primary balance is 
not statistically significant. Hence, there is evidence that the monetary authorities are following 
an active policy regime, not taking the fiscal policy results into its decision making. 
Regarding the other explanatory variables, the results are similar to the ones found when 
estimating Equation (2). The one-period lagged nominal interest rate and the inflation rate have 
a positive impact over the nominal interest rate, and when each one increases by 1%, the 
dependent variable rises by 0.595% and 1.064%, respectively. Concerning the after-crisis 
period, it seems to have a bigger impact on the monetary policy reaction function than in the 
estimation of Equation (2). The interest rates are, on average, 0.940% lower than in the period 
before the financial crisis. 
 
Table 3 – Monetary Policy Reaction Function with Fiscal determinants 
Method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE GMM 
Group EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU 
Constant   1.492**   1.429***   -0.647   -0.977   0.653   -3.703   1.540  
   (0.715)   (0.492)   (1.366)   (0.625)   (0.617)   (2.777)   1.540  
ijt-1  0.586***   0.627***   0.542***    0.572***   0.532***   0.552***  0.595***  
   (0.018)   (0.025)   (0.029)   (0.044)   (0.037)   (0.139)   (0.023)  
infjt  1.163***   0.630***   1.295***   1.156***   0.981***   1.257**   1.064*** 
   (0.052)   (0.079)   (0.088)   (0.166)   (0.147)   (0.532)   (0.075)  
reerjt  -0.012   -0.007   0.011   0.014**   0.001   0.043   -0.012  
   (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.014)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.028)   (0.016)  
aftcrijt   -0.964***   -1.241***   -0.969**   -1.131***   -1.401***   -1.136**   -0.940***  
   (0.166)   (0.153)   (0.414)   (0.168)   (0.188)   (0.455)   (0.194)  
capbjt-1   -0.008   -0.020   -0.018   -0.042   -0.038   -0.065   -0.009  
   (0.025)   (0.018)   (0.064)   (0.031)   (0.027)   (0.083)    (1.529) 
N   633   437   196    605   418   187  633  
R2   0.917   0.840   0.936   0.917   0.815   0.939  -  
Countries  28   19   9   28   19   9   28  
 Hausman prob.   0.030   0.645   0.741   0.521   0.928   0.999   -  
AR(2)   - -  -  -  -  -   0.508 
Hansen stat.   - -  -  -  -  -   0.267   
 





Looking at the euro area and the non-euro area countries, it is possible to observe that the 
real effective exchange rate and the cyclically adjusted primary balance are still the only 
variables that are not statistically significant. Therefore, we make the same conclusion as for 
the EU: the central banks do not take into consideration the government’s action. An increase 
of 1% in the one-period lagged nominal interest rate increases the nominal interest rate by 
0.0532% in the euro area and by 0.552% in countries that did not adopt the euro. When looking 
at the inflation rate, as in Equation (2), it has a higher impact on the dependent variable if we 
consider non-euro area countries. When it increases by 1%, the nominal interest rate rises by 
1.257% in those countries and only by 0.981% in the euro area. Regarding the 2009-2019 
period, we conclude the same as for the EU: the coefficients are higher in this situation, when 
compared to the monetary authority alone. While in the euro area the interest rates dropped, on 
average, 1.401% in the post-crisis, in the non-euro area countries they only decreased by 
1.136%, on average. 
 
4.4. Fiscal Policy Reaction Function and Monetary Determinants 
To assess whether monetary policy has some influence over the fiscal policy developments, 
we take into consideration Equations (3) and (4) and change them, by adding the lagged short-
term nominal interest rate and the lagged long-term nominal interest rate (il). We include the 
latter one, in order to try to capture forward guidance developed by central banks. Then, the 
new regressions are given by: 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑗𝑡  = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑙𝑗𝑡−1 + µ𝑖𝑡         (6) 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑗𝑡  = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑏𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑙𝑗𝑡−1 + µ𝑖𝑡.     (7) 
 
The results from the estimation of regressions (6) and (7) are presented respectively in Table 
5 and in Table A3 in the Appendix. Firstly, considering regression (6) looking at the EU, we 
can observe that, when dealing with endogeneity, all variables are statistically significant at a 
1% level3, besides the long-term nominal interest rate. This may indicate that the forward 
guidance developed by central banks does not influence governments’ decision making. 
Contrarily, one aspect that stands out is that fiscal policy is affected by the monetary authorities’ 
                                                     
3 In this situation we will resort to the 2SLS method, since the Hansen statistics for the GMM is too high to be 




decision making, at least for the short-term nominal interest rates. In fact, an increase of 1% in 
that independent variable leads to a decrease of 0.66% on the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance. This suggests a relationship of substitutability between the monetary and fiscal 
policies. 
With respect to the lagged cyclically adjusted primary balance and the lagged debt level, the 
results are similar to those estimated in Equation (3). When these variables increase by 1%, the 
interest rate rises by 0.629% and 0.059%, respectively. As determined when estimating 
Equation (3), the cyclically adjusted primary balance reacts positively to the debt level, allowing 
us to assume that in the EU a Ricardian fiscal regime is followed. Notably, in the after-crisis 
period, the effect over the dependent variable is much higher for the fiscal policy reaction 
function than the one estimated for the fiscal policy alone. In this situation the Great Recession 
lowered the cyclically adjusted primary balance by 2.450%, on average. 
 
Table 5 - Fiscal Policy Reaction Function with Monetary Determinants 
Method OLS-FE OLS-RE OLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE GMM 
Group EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU 
 Constant  -1.395*** -2.052*** -0.927 -0.822 -1.353* -0.176 1.036** 
  (0.444) (0.575) (0.712) (0.531) (0.708) (0.569) (0.404) 
ijt-1  0.605*** 0.585*** 0.666*** 0.627*** 0.647*** 0.688*** 0.680*** 
  (0.032) (0.038) (0.055) (0.054) (0.069) (0.060) (0.041) 
infjt  0.056*** 0.064*** 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.013* 0.011*** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) 
reerjt -2.194*** -2.584*** -1.160*** -2.450*** -2.721*** -1.256*** -1.708*** 
  (0.248) (0.320) (0.354) (0.309) (0.406) (0.342) (0.301) 
aftcrijt -0.107* -0.061 -0.266*** -0.366*** -0.357*** -0.583*** 0.276*** 
  (0.058) (0.077) (0.096) (0.089) (0.122) (0.119) (0.104) 
capbjt-1 -0.088 -0.132* 0.191 0.075 0.051 0.447 0.023 
  (0.060) (0.069) (0.143) (0.099) (0.119) (0.170) (0.133) 
N  571 408 163 543 389 154 571 
R2  0.552 0.549 0.606 0.550 0.546 0.597 - 
Countries 28 19 9 28 19 9 28 
Hausman prob.  0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.080 - 
AR(2)  - - - - - - 0.388 
Hansen stat.  - - - - - - 0.661 
 





Now considering Equation (7), it is possible to observe that for the Euro area all variables 
are statistically significant at a 1% level,4 besides the dummy for the after crisis period and the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance. Juxtaposing these estimations with those found for the 
specification (6), the differences that stand out are that, in this case, the period after the financial 
crisis seems to have no impact over the dependent variables, while the long-term nominal 
interest has. In fact, there is evidence that an increase of 1% in the long-term nominal interest 
rate leads the cyclically adjusted primary balance to soar by 0.442%. Regarding the variation in 
public debt, when it increases by 1%, it leads to a decrease of 0.512% in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance. 
Looking at the two sub-groups, euro area and non-euro area countries, all variables, besides 
the long-term nominal interest rate and the lagged debt level of the non-euro area countries, 
continue to be statistically significant at a 1% level. For the countries that did not adopt the 
euro, the lagged debt level is only statistically significant at a 10% level. There is evidence that 
the cyclically adjusted primary balance is positively affected by its lag. However, considering 
the government’s reaction function, the impact is higher in the non-euro area countries than in 
the euro area, while when performing the analysis solely for the fiscal policy, the results were 
the opposite. Regarding the lagged debt level, its coefficient is slightly higher in the euro area, 
leading to an increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance of 0.052% when rising 1%, 
comparing with an increase of 0.013% for the non-euro area countries. 
For the post-crisis period, it is clear that the crisis’ negative impact was significantly higher 
in the countries that adopted the euro. The decrease of the cyclically adjusted primary balance, 
in the euro area countries was on average of 2.721%, more than double than that in the countries 
that did not adopt the euro, where it suffered a decrease of 1.256%, on average. Regarding the 
one-period lagged short-term nominal interest rate, it has a negative coefficient on both areas, 
indicating a substitution effect between the twopolicies. However, there is evidence that the 
governments of countries that did not adopt the euro are more affected by changes in the lagged 
short-term nominal interest rate. In fact, a change of 1% on that variable leads to a variation, on 
the cyclically adjusted primary balance, of -0.357% in the euro area and -.583% in the non-euro 
area countries. 
                                                     
4 In this situation we will resort to the 2SLS method, since the Hansen statistics for the GMM is too high to be 




Observing again Equation (7), we can state that for the euro area all variables are statistically 
significant at a 1% level, besides the dummy for the after crisis period and the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance, while for non-euro area countries only the variation of the debt level 
is not statistically significant at a 5% level. Comparing the results presented above with the 
ones estimated for this regression, it is curious to observe that on the one hand, the lagged 
cyclically adjusted primary seems to have no influence over the dependent variable in the euro 
area and have for the other countries, while on the other hand the opposite happens with the 
variation of public debt. Another aspect that stands out is that the period after the Great 
Recession only as an impact on the countries that do not belong to the euro area. As for the EU, 
the long-term nominal interest rate impacts the dependent variables in both sub-groups, 
however with a higher magnitude for non-euro area countries. In fact, an increase of 1% in the 
long-term nominal interest rate leads to a soar of 0.539% in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance in non-euro countries and of only 0.421% for the euro area ones. 
In sum, the results that we find for the estimation of the reaction function of monetary policy 
to fiscal variables, and the other way around, are in line with the studies done by Alcidi and 
Thirion (2016), Silva and Vieira (2017), and Afonso et al. (2019). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
During the last years, the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies gained renewed 
importance due to the Great Recession. In the EU, this discussion acquires even more 
importance, since the countries that belong to the euro area have centralized monetary policy, 
but the government of each country is responsible for the fiscal policy. The adoption of 
extraordinary policies, from both monetary and fiscal authorities, may have led to a change on 
the policy mix. On the monetary policy side, the zero lower bound and the implementation of 
unconventional monetary policy, and for the fiscal policy the especial packages implemented, 
led to a combination of measures that had never been seen before. 
By using panel data, our objective was to understand how each policy behaved in the 
European Union, between 1995 and 2019, and how their interactions might have been affected. 
Furthermore, we did the same analysis for two sub-regions, the euro area and the non-euro area 
countries, in order to assess if there are any differences between the countries that adopted the 
euro and the ones that did not. 
Regarding the monetary policy reaction function, we find that the inflation rate has a big 




that do not belong to the euro area. Having inflation has a crucial variable for the determination 
of interest rates was expected, since most central banks define price stability as their mandate. 
Another aspect, that is not surprising, is that in the post-crisis period the interest rates declined, 
with a higher impact on the euro area. The real effective exchange rate seems to have no effect 
over the interest rate. 
Concerning fiscal policy, the cyclically adjusted primary balance reacts positively to 
increases in the level of government debt. This idea reveals a Ricardian fiscal regime, disclosing 
that fiscal authorities are concerned with the health of public finances. Furthermore, after the 
Great Recession the cyclically adjusted primary balance decreased and, when comparing the 
two sub-regions, the euro area was more affected. This last effect was expected, since it reflects 
the sovereign crisis that some countries went through. We also found evidence that there is a 
negative relation between the variation of the cyclically adjusted primary balance and the 
variable that represents the variation of the public debt that occurred in the previous year. 
We also estimated the reaction functions for monetary policy, considering a fiscal variable, 
and for fiscal policy, considering monetary determinants. Our estimation showed that monetary 
policy reaction functions do not seem to take into consideration the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance, hence presenting an active monetary policy behaviour. On the other hand, fiscal policy, 
via the cycally adjusted primary balance, seem to be affected by the short-term interest rate in 
a negative way. This hints that the relation between those policies is of substitution. Moreover, 
there is evidence that this substitutability is of a higher degree for the countries that do not use 
the euro. 
Summing up, the conception that monetary policy independently controls the stability of the 
price level, while governments try to keep a good health for the public finances ends up being 
confirmed. Nevertheless, the monetary authority presents an active role, taking action when the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance gets out of hand. Going along with the existing literature, 
this suggests a relation of substitutability between monetary and fiscal policies. Moreover, the 
euro area states were more affected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis than the other countries 
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Table A1 – Data Description and Transformations 
Variable Definition Unit Source 
capb   Cyclically adjusted primary balance   Percentage of GDP at 
current prices  
 AMECO 
debt   Debt ratio   Percentage of GDP at 
current prices  
 AMECO 
i   Nominal short-term interest rate   %   AMECO 
il   Nominal long-term interest rate   %   AMECO 
reer   Real effective exchange rate   Index (2015 = 100)   AMECO 
hcpi   Harmonized consumer price index   Index (2015 = 100)   AMECO  




Table A2 - Fiscal Policy Reaction Function to Monetary Variables with the variation of 
public debt as independent variable 
Method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE GMM 
Group   EU   Euro Area   Non-Euro 
Area  
 EU   Euro Area   Non-Euro 
Area  
 EU   
Constant   0.233*   0.341**   0.024   0.189   0.415*    -0.254   0.316**  
   (0.121)   (0.159)   (0.166)   (0.313)   (0.158)   (0.243)   (0.124)  
capbjt-1   0.558***   0.526***   0.665***   0.220*   0.112    0.323   0.781***  
   (0.040)   (0.050)   (0.065)   (0.0.121)   (0.163)   (0.214)   (0.061)   
debtjt-1   -0.081***   -0.094***   -0.041   -0.467***   -0.525***   -0.492**   0.056 
   (0.023)   (0.029)   (0.036)   (0.102)   (0.129)    (0.222)   (0.037)  
aftcrijt   -0.340*   -0.421*   -0.153   0.0.211   0.159   0.478   -0.677***  
   (0.179)   (0.235)   (0.246)   (0.159)   (0.341)   (0.396)   (0.155)  
N   637   437   200   609   418    191   637  
R2   0.467   0.452   0.536   0.360   0.326   0.396   -  
Countries  28   19   9   28   19   9   28  
Hausman prob.   0.000   0.000   0.025   0.094   0.064   0.339   -  
AR(2)   -  -  -  -  -  -  0.949 
Hansen stat.   -  -  -  -  -   -   0.404   
 





Table A3 - Fiscal Policy Reaction Function to Monetary Variables with the variation of 
public debt as independent variable 
Method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE 2SLS-RE GMM 
Group EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU Euro Area Non-Euro 
Area 
EU 
Constant   1.370***    1.555***   0.383   0.232   0.661   0.425  1.737***   
   (0.314)    (0.380)   (0.466)   (0.526)   (0.754)   (0.589)   (0.404)  
capbjt-1   0.571***   0.560***   0.721***   0.221*   0.192   0.604***   0.786***  
   (0.043)   (0.051)   (0.061)   (0.120)   (0.175)   (0.116)   (0.066)    
debt jt-1   -0.067***   -0.063**   -0.050   -0.512***   -0.513***   -0.103   0.083* 
   (0.026)   (0.030)   (0.045)   (0.113)   (0.160)   (0.120)   (0.045)  
aftcri jt   -1.1383**   -1.618***   -0.691**   -0.562   -0.923   -0.984**    -1.696***  
   (0.252)   (0.326)   (0.312)   ((0.406)   (0.642)   (0.404)    (0.295)  
 i jt-1   -0.342***   -0.094***   -0.389***   -0.522***   -0.599***   -0.607***   -0.338*** 
   (0.055)    (0.074)   (0.083)   0.081)   (0.129)   (0.123)   (0.087)  
 il jt-1   0.107*   0.087   0.336***   0.442***   0.421***   0.539***   0.034 
   (0.061)    (0.070)   (0.466)   (0.110)   (0.134)   (0.177)   (0.108)  
N   557   397   160   529   378   151    557  
R2   0.516   0.503   0.593   0.385   0.361   0.601   -  
countries  28   19   9   28   19   9   28  
Hausman prob.   0.000   0.027   0.151   0.250   0.649   0.199  
AR(2)   -  -  -  -  -  -  0.451 
Hansen stat.   -  -  -  -  -   -   0.621   
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *, 10%; **, 5% ; *** 1%. 
 
